resources to achieve national security objectives. To develop, implement, and sustain a viable strategy for cyberspace DoD leadership must focus defense policy on resources required to develop military and civilian leadership, and to train our military forces to defend the global information grid and assist in the protection of commercial networks as necessary to defend U.S. interests. Based on strategic guidance and the recent standup of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its mission to defend DoD networks and to centralize command of cyberspace operations, Congress must authorize USCYBERCOM in coordination with DHS to act appropriately in defense of our nation"s commercial and military information networks.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN CYBERSPACE
This paper examines current national and Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace strategy and its implementation throughout the DoD, the Service components and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It will also examine how the U.S. government has organized its cyber resources to command, control and Furthermore, the strategic command and control structure of cyberspace must develop resources to employ a joint military and civilian information dominance corps, made up of trained cyber warriors that are supported by dynamic lines of authority and tasked as an integrated cyber warfare ready response team. Based on strategic guidance and the recent standup of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its mission to defend DoD networks, and to centralize command of cyberspace operations, Congress must authorize USCYBERCOM in coordination with DHS to act appropriately in defense of our nation"s commercial and military information networks.
Cyberspace Strategy
According to James A. Lewis, on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cybersecurity, networked and digital information technologies provide the national infrastructure new ways to organize, interact and create wealthactions that can now take place in cyberspace. 3 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes cyberspace as a critical part of the global commons on par with land, air, sea and space realms of interchange. 4 Analogous to the U.S. Navy in keeping the sea lines of communication secure and open for free and unfettered shipping commerce; cyberspace has now become the common connector for transactional trade and commerce, thus it has become an essential path to global economic stability and national security. According to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of May 2010, cyber security threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation. The same technologies and networks that enable our military superiority are also unclassified and constantly probed by intruders and cyber criminals. 5 To secure and defend our nation from cyber attacks and conduct small or large scale military operations, the armed forces need to operate in cyberspace and defend cyberspace just as they would on land, in the air, or at sea. Neither government nor the private sector nor individual citizens can meet this challenge alone.
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To this end, the military requires resilient, reliable information systems and communications networks and unfettered access to the cyberspace domain. 7 The 2010 QDR states the DoD is taking several steps to strengthen capabilities in cyberspace to:
 Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace;
 develop greater expertise and awareness;
 centralize command of cyber operations; and  enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments. 8 Developing and maintaining a joint cyber strategy will provide dynamic and flexible C2
needed to provide assured access to the global commons and cyberspace. According to the National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2011, Joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace constitutes a core aspect of U.S. national security and remains an enduring mission for the Joint Force. 9 Articulating a Joint Force strategy in cyberspace is necessary, as cyberspace becomes a core competency of the armed forces. Most importantly, the leadership needed to continue to develop and carry out a Joint Force strategy will determine if we can achieve objectives in cyberspace, as defined by NSS 2010, QDR 2010, and NMS 2011. Our strategy and leadership in cyberspace must include an expanded means to provide information to our allies and to develop partnerships with a diverse population of actors found throughout the cyberspace domain. Moreover, operating effectively in cyberspace will need strategic leaders that can understand and apply resources of both people and technology to this vast and growing domain.
According to Presidential Cyberspace Policy Review, the threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21 st Century for the United States and our allies. 10 The case for organization and dynamic C2 of our nation"s cyber resources stems from President Obama"s directed review of cyberspace policy and the growing need to defend a highly technical domain critical to economic prosperity and military information superiority. To protect these critical economic sectors and governmental agencies from decay or loss, the NSS of 2010
states that as a nation we will deter, prevent, detect, defend against, and quickly recover from cyber intrusions and attacks by: investing in people and technology and by strengthening partnerships. 11 As vague and broad as this statement is, our strategy must define the requirement from an organizational standpoint and install a C2 structure that can lead this effort with the resources and capabilities of trusted partnerships from DoD, DHS, National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Industrial Base, Science and Technology (S&T), and our allies and international partners.
General Keith Alexander, Commander of USCYBERCOM, in his recent testimony to congress stated, "In 2009, there were more than 1.8 billion internet users, and 4.6 billion cellular subscribers; together they sent roughly 90 trillion e-mails." 12 As stated in the National Military Strategy of 2011, the cyber threat is expanded and exacerbated by the lack of international norms, difficulties of attribution, low barriers to entry, and the relative ease of developing potent capabilities. 13 Cyberspace enables nation-states to conduct espionage and employ cyber warfare to attack other states or entities, either solely in the cyber domain or as part of a full-spectrum military maneuver. 14 Understanding the motive and ordered effects of cyber attacks will assist our nation"s leaders to develop national and international cyber law, cyber defense, cyber warfare rules of engagement, and when an attack warrants the need for an immediate non-kinetic response. 15 To answer cyber operational needs our computer network exploitation and defense capabilities must keep pace with the rapid advances in computer network technology and the cyber analytical tools needed to defend and counter threats and crimes in cyberspace.
Cyber warfare in the form of exploiting and attacking critical infrastructure has the potential to cripple a nation"s power grid, its financial resources or even its military networks and its operating forces, all of which can become a threat to national security. the CNCI should become part of the U.S. strategy to combat cyber security issues. 18 In doing so, President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. 19 Furthermore, to advance national cybersecurity, the CNCI articulates twelve initiatives that the US government must fund in order to improve and strengthen strategic capabilities within federal agencies and key functions to include criminal investigation, intelligence collection, analysis, and information assurance supporting national cybersecurity objectives. Of the twelve initiatives put forward in the CNCI, initiatives 1 -3, 5 and 12, are specifically linked to the organization of DoD and federal cyber agencies, and the resources needed to monitor and respond to cyber attacks.
In short, CNCI #1 details the need for a single federal network enterprise with Cyberspace capabilities enable Combatant Commanders to operate effectively across all domains. Strategic Command and Cyber Command will collaborate with U.S. government agencies, non-government entities, industry, and international actors to develop new cyber norms, capabilities, organizations, and skills. Should a large scale cyber intrusion or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must provide a broad range of options to ensure our access and use of the cyberspace domain and hold malicious actors accountable. We must seek executive and congressional action to provide new authorities to enable effective action in cyberspace. 28 In order to achieve situational awareness in cyberspace and the ability to provide war fighting effects within and through cyberspace, Secretary Gates has determined that it is appropriate for each Service to develop capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations;
and that improvements are needed in training and education to field a professional force, and in command and control for cyberspace operations. 29 One could argue that achieving war fighting effects in cyberspace cannot be achieved by a single Service component or even a sub-unified command such as USCYBERCOM; success in this area can only be accomplished by a Joint Force that includes cooperation with DHS and collaboration with our allies. NMS 2011 states, the collective and interlinked domains of air, space and cyberspace are essential to the Joint Force projection and sustainment of power and ability to deter and defeat aggression. 30 Moreover, in a domain that already connects DoD, the services, and other government agencies, the Department must pursue joint doctrine that supports joint training, funding, S&T, and exercises C2 of the service components as one integrated cyber response team.
Secretary Gates in the QRM stated, "Cyberspace offers the U.S. military unprecedented opportunities to shape and control the battlespace to achieve national objectives." 31 In support of USCYBERCOM mission to protect DoD networks and to achieve objectives outlined in the CNCI, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security signed a memorandum of agreement that outlines terms by which DHS and DoD will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the nation"s cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities. 38 Key to implementation of this agreement will be the organizations ability within DoD and DHS to coordinate lines of operation that are mutually supporting and work to increase capacity and capability for both homeland and national security missions, while providing integral protection for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. The standup of USCYBERCOM and the service components must go beyond a facelift reorganization of personnel and resources. To be effective, USCYBERCOM must develop and implement a strategy that pushes far past the boundaries of information sharing and collaboration, and institute a truly comprehensive approach that compels its components to organize in a way that eliminates barriers and promotes innovation and cooperation. Not only must it synchronize operations within USCYBERCOM, but it must also synchronize operations with DoD, DHS, and other governmental agencies. USCYBERCOM must establish clear and unambiguous priorities that are codified in doctrine and hold the services accountable for developing capabilities that actually provide superiority and freedom of action in cyberspace. In other words DoD can no longer organize and then reorganize for the sake of standing up a new organization with a new name. The Goldwater -Nichols act of 1986 sought to meld the DoD tectonic divide between operational and administrative control of military forces. 42 The same kind of studied treatment must be given to cyberspace and the way it is fielded, maintained, commanded and controlled. 43 How USCYBERCOM organizes and implements C2 of its resources and DoD networks will make a significant impact on how DoD and the services operate in cyberspace. This corps of professionals will receive extensive training, education, and work experience in information, intelligence, counterintelligence, human derived information, networks, space, and oceanographic disciplines. 48 The IDC will develop and deliver dominant information capabilities in support of U.S. Navy, Joint and National warfighting requirements. 49 Together the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) and Commander FLTCYBERCOM/C10F have elevated the role of information, cyber, space, and networks in the Navy"s operations and investments, as a war fighting domain. 50 The reorganization and combining of staffs and Navy designators to establish the IDC provides a leadership framework and C2 structure to focus unity of effort for defending cyberspace and supports the NMS. The formation of the IDC is probably the most powerful part of the combined package to achieve cyberspace war fighting effects for USCYBERCOM and the Navy; however, it is also the most vulnerable due to the potential for cultural clashes and stovepipes to drive solutions. To overcome these barriers to innovation, IDC leadership must provide a vision that empowers its people to innovate. Meanwhile the IDC must develop a professional force structure that is trained and ready to fight and win the nation"s wars in cyberspace. resourced by service specific funding, acquisition, S&T, and doctrine will be able to support a decentralized C2 structure with centralized tasks and common objectives, yet grossly needed to defend DoD networks and the nation"s networks from attack.
US Fleet Cyber

Leadership in Cyberspace
Cyber-strategic leadership is not a specific technical skill or person, but a set of knowledge, skills, and attributes essential to all leaders at all levels of government and in the private sector. 55 In an article published by The Heritage Foundation that discusses cyber leadership in the twenty first century, Dr. James Carafano and Eric Sayers articulate:
Even as Washington wrestles with issues concerning organizations, authorities, responsibilities, and programs to deal with cyber competition, it must place more emphasis on developing leaders who are competent to engage in these issues. This will require a professional development system that can provide a program of education, assignment, and accreditation to develop a corps of experienced, dedicated service professionals who have expertise in the breath of issues related to the cyber environment. This program must be backed by effective publicprivate partnerships that produce cutting-edge research, development, and capabilities to operate with freedom, safety, and security in the cyber world. the Navy operates its combat capabilities in the cyberspace domain, takes on a strategic sense of urgency to get it right, now.
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Never before has the Chief of Naval Operations named a three-star Intelligence
Officer and a three-star Surface Warfare Officer to lead and develop the Navy"s Information Dominance Corps, and its cyber forces to accomplish the cyberspace mission. Admiral Mullen argues that, to shape the future force, we must grow leaders who can truly out-think and out-innovate adversaries while gaining trust, understanding, and cooperation from our partners in an ever-more complex and dynamic environment. 59 His argument is exactly what professional military leaders must do to get ahead and stay ahead of our competitors. In order for a strategic leader to effect change in largely complex organizations he must have the capacity, at the strategic level, to envision the future. VADM Dorsett is a cyber strategic leader because he has provided that vision for the IDC and has offered to transform the Navy"s information capabilities to deliver game-changing decision superiority and command and control overmatch. 60 Kotter argues that, "vision plays a key role in producing change by helping to direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people." 61 Vision provides a sense of ultimate purpose, direction, and motivation for all members and activities within an enterprise. 62 While providing vision may help to direct or align mission, it is not a substitute for getting the job done.
With the standup of Fleet Cyber Command, VADM McCullough has the complex task of adapting the Navy"s cyber warfare vision to over 45,000 personnel. Through his strategic leadership he must adapt and better align Fleet Cyber Command with its rapidly changing and highly technological environment. His goal is to transform a highly
technical, yet mostly static and reactive network operations capability, to a more proactive and dynamic capability. Burke infers that leadership is a personal matter, understanding more about the proper match between a leader"s personality and the desired organizational culture is critical to successful change. 63 Achieving transformation and a unified vision will require a continued investment by senior navy leadership to develop the cyber force and to create a climate that will motivate the IDC and its culture to move with the changing tide of technology. At the strategic level, technical competencies include an understanding of organizational systems, an appreciation of functional relationships outside the organization, and knowledge of the broader political and social systems within which the organization operates. 64 
VADM
McCullough"s initial focus is on networks and how to command and control his cyber forces globally. His near term goal is to establish dynamic cyber operations, which includes defense, as well as exploitation and development of non-kinetic effects.
Now that VADM McCullough has shared the Navy"s vision on cyber warfare with the House Armed Services Committee, and VADM Dorsett has shared his vision on information dominance with the Navy, they must develop definable objectives, concepts and resources to achieve the mission. Furthermore, one could argue that for real transformation to take place regarding the C2 of cyberspace, the four service components and USCYBERCOM will need to share and develop objectives and resources to achieve the mission. Thus, visions serve another purpose -that of accountability." 65 Accordingly, the espoused vision holds the strategic leader accountable to its employees and external stakeholders, as well as holding the organization accountable for maintaining structure, process, and alignment to the vision. 66 Cyberspace Strategy
The major goal of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) of March 2010 is to establish a front line of defense against today"s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the federal government, and ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partners, and the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions. 67 In support of the CNCI, and according to commercial cyber domain as necessary to protect national interests. This option will be acceptable to most private, public and federal agencies once buy-in by congress and federal agencies occur. Strategic communication will garner acceptability and buy-in from public and private institutions with emphasis on maintaining privacy for US citizens.
This option meets suitability objectives for CNCI #1, #2, #3, #5 and #12, supports NSS, DoD, NMS, and QDR cyber space objectives to defend DoD networks and the GIG, and enables USCYBERCOM to use both offensive and defensive cyber weapons in defense of DoD, and the nation" s public and private networks. Feasibility will be driven by
Congress to commit significant resources of funding for new information systems and training for network administrators and cyber analysts. This option reduces risk by decentralizing monitoring and cyber response activities, and promotes the need for a single federal network enterprise with Trusted Internet Connections that are truly compliant with industry standards. Additionally, this option provides a ready force of over 82,000 military intelligence and cyber experts.
Conclusion
A prosperous and interconnected world requires a stable and secure environment, the absence of territorial aggression or conflict between states, and reliable access to resources and cyberspace for stable markets. 69 Developing a
strategic, yet flexible and dynamic organizational structure for DoD and DHS to respond to cyber attacks that pose a threat to national security, and to deter cyber acts of war through computer network defense in the cyber domain will be a challenge for many.
Training and education in the cyber domain will assist both our cyber leaders and the cyber workforce to develop, implement, and sustain an organizational structure that addresses command and control issues and lead to development of national and international cyber law. It will also assist in developing military and civilian cyber leadership, develop a cyber deterrence policy, develop cyber attack rules of engagement, and develop our military forces to defend the global information grid, provide unclassified assistance to commercial network providers, and to exploit and attack cyber transgressions as necessary to defend U.S. interests.
Based on strategic guidance and the recent standup of USCYBERCOM and its mission to defend DoD networks and the GIG, and to centralize command of cyberspace operations, the third option would be the most prudent use of cyber resources available today to protect and secure the nation"s networks and ensure freedom of action in the cyber domain. To this end Congress must authorize DHS and USCYBERCOM to act appropriately in defense of our nation"s commercial and military information networks. Additionally, Congress must authorize USCYBERCOM to use both offensive and defensive cyber weapons and the tools necessary to hunt down cyber criminals based on rule of law and the legal framework. The U.S. government must also establish cyber partnerships with international stakeholders, its allies, and all federal agencies. USCYBERCOM and its service components while conducting operations in cyberspace, must comply with oversight and compliance policy managed by DHS/NCSC. The third option best supports the President"s National Security
Strategy for 2010, the 2010 CNCI, DoD, QDR, and NMS objectives and enables our nation to prosper and grow in cyberspace, the fifth domain.
Endnotes
